Canadian Military History
Volume 28

Issue 1

Article 23

2019

Outpost: The Dominion of Canada’s Colonial Garrison in Manitoba,
1870 to 1877
David Grebstad

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh
Part of the Military History Commons

Recommended Citation
Grebstad, David "Outpost: The Dominion of Canada’s Colonial Garrison in Manitoba, 1870 to 1877."
Canadian Military History 28, 1 (2019)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more
information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.

Grebstad: Outpost

Outpost
The Dominion of Canada’s Colonial Garrison in
Manitoba, 1870 to 1877
DAVID GREBSTAD
Abstract : Military garrisons were a common requirement of empires,
ancient or modern, in order to secure and maintain their imperial
authority in colonies. Nineteenth century Canada was no different. When
the Dominion of Canada annexed the North-Western interior of North
America in 1870, it acquired a peripheral colony to be exploited by the
economic, political, and cultural metropole of central Canada. Between
1870-1877, the Dominion maintained a garrison of Active Militia in what
is now Winnipeg to pre-empt external aggression, bring order to the
frontier, and conduct policing duties in the rough and tumble nascent
Province of Manitoba.

M

were a common requirement of empires,
ancient or modern, in order to secure and maintain their
imperial authority in colonies. The British Empire was no different as
throughout the modern period, but most especially in the nineteenth
century, the British maintained an expansive network of garrisons to
secure their colonies around the world. British colonial garrisons were
deployed haphazardly throughout the latter half of the eighteenth
century, and then with more determination and order as the British
imperium spread after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. By the midnineteenth century, however, the rising cost of these garrisons worried
British political leadership, and by the 1860’s there was a determined
cry in the corridors of Whitehall and Westminster to reduce the
expensive imperial footprint. By 1871, save for strategically vital
points such as Esquimalt, Halifax and Gibraltar, the British legions
were called home. Importantly, as the British imperial footprint
ilitary garrisons
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receded, the imperial aspirations of the Dominion of Canada in the
North-American continental interior increased.
When the Dominion of Canada annexed the North-Western
interior of North America in 1870, it acquired a peripheral colony to be
exploited by the economic, political, and cultural metropole of central
Canada.1 As its ancient and contemporary imperial confrères had
done, Canada was required to deploy a military garrison in order to
achieve key military objectives. The three military-strategic objectives
of these garrisons were articulated by historian Peter Burroughs in
the Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History thusly: preempting external aggression by foreign powers; bringing order to
unstable or lawless frontiers, and conducting internal or policing
duties.2 Although the young Dominion Government had hoped the
British would provide this service, the political leadership in London,
who were bent on centralizing the army at home, steadfastly refused.
Consequently, between 1870 and 1877 the Dominion government
maintained a colonial garrison of Canadian Active Militia soldiers in
the Red River Settlement.3
Lamentably, the story of the Dominion military force on service
in Manitoba is practically unknown as very little historical rigour
has been directed towards it.4 Little is known of its constitution, its
actions, what life on the frontier was like or how the force served to
establish and maintain Canadian authority in the region. The aim of
1  
For an excellent historical summary of how the established provinces of the
Dominion of Canada treated the North-West as a colony with natural-resources to
exploit, see Mary Janigan, Let the Eastern Bastards Freeze in the Dark: The West
versus the Rest since Confederation, (Toronto: Knopf, 2012).
2  
Peter Burroughs, “Imperial Defence and the Victorian Army,” The Journal of
Imperial and Commonwealth History 15, no. 1 (July 2008), 58.
3  
Although known as Winnipeg today, several terms were used interchangeably to
refer to the region which has since been subsumed by the City of Winnipeg. The
Red River Settlement included a number of parishes along the Red and Assiniboine
Rivers. Fort Garry, also known as Upper Fort Garry to differentiate it from another
fort further north near Selkirk, Manitoba, was the Hudson’s Bay Company post near
the forks of those two rivers, and the village of Winnipeg was one of the parishes
of the Red River Settlement, lying just north of Fort Garry. Contemporaries often
used these terms interchangeably, particularly when the village of Winnipeg grew so
exponentially after 1870, eventually geographically dominating the local area.
4  
There are some important exceptions. See George Francis Gillman. Stanley, Toil
& Trouble: Military Expeditions to Red River (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1989)
and Frederic Shore’s unpublished doctoral thesis for the University of Manitoba
The Canadians and the Métis: The Re-creation of Manitoba, 1858-1872. (Ottawa:
National Library of Canada, 1993.)
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this article is to rectify this situation and fill a regrettable gap in the
narrative of Canadian military history. It will do so by first providing
a brief historical sketch of the creation, deployment and changing
characteristics of the Dominion garrison in Winnipeg from 1870 to
1877. Afterwards, it will illustrate how this garrison achieved the very
same strategic military objectives of British imperial garrisons during
the height of the British Empire, namely as a military deterrent to
external aggressors, a force to stabilize the frontier for settlement, and
in the provision of law and order. Finally, it will illustrate the more
nefarious aspects of the militia garrison, particularly the soldiers’
racial and culturally-motivated violence against Métis inhabitants of
the region. In so doing, this article should shed some light on an
unfortunately neglected, yet interesting and important, chapter in
Canadian military history.

the red river expedition
The story of the Canadian garrison in Manitoba cannot be considered
without reference to the singular event that caused its creation, the
Red River Resistance of 1869-70. The resistance is itself an historical
event of great importance to Canadian history, too complex to be
discussed in detail here. That notwithstanding, a brief survey of
how the Resistance led to Canadian annexation is important to
contextualize the deployment of the garrison to Manitoba.
The history of the North-West predates European contact by
millennia, inhabited as it was by Indigenous peoples for centuries
before the first European explorers and traders penetrated the heart
of the continent. Europeans arrived in the region in the seventeenth
century, and immediately recognized the commercial value of the
region’s natural resources, particularly its furs. In 1670, the Hudson’s
Bay Company formed in London and received a royal charter from
the British government for exclusive trading authority in the Hudson’s
Bay watershed, a region known to Europeans as Rupert’s Land. The
Hudson’s Bay Company was joined in the exploitation of the region’s
natural resources by other trading companies, such as the Montrealbased North-West Company and the XY Company, also known as the
New North-West Company. The latter two companies joined forces
in 1805, and eventually merged with the Hudson’s Bay Company in
1821 after much acrimony and violence. After 1821, the Hudson’s Bay
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Company became the de facto, and to a degree the de jure, colonial
authority in the North-West.
In addition to fur traders, Thomas Douglas, 5th Earl of Selkirk,
also known simply as Lord Selkirk, established a colony of Scottish
emigres in the Red River Valley in 1811 on land granted him by the
Hudson’s Bay Company, near where the city of Winnipeg is currently
situated. The Red River Settlement, as it came to be known, was
soon the focal point of the entire North-West in the early nineteenth
century due to the presence of both the Selkirk settlement and the
principal Hudson’s Bay Company Trading Post at Fort Garry, both
situated near the confluence of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers.
Unsurprisingly, the European settlers chose a location that had been
a traditional Indigenous meeting and trading location for centuries.
By the late 1860s, we find that the area of the Red River Settlement
was a sparsely populated yet culturally pluralistic conglomeration
of Indigenous peoples, French and English Métis, descendants of
Selkirk’s Scottish emigres, Canadian immigrants, and Hudson’s Bay
Company officials and traders.
In the mid-nineteenth century the financial fortunes of the
Hudson’s Bay Company began to wane, and Canadian interest in
acquiring the North-West for exploitation increased. Late nineteenth
century explorations and surveys of the North-West revealed that
“The Great Lone Land,” as it was termed by British soldier and
explorer William Butler, may have been in many ways devoid of
activity, but it was nonetheless full of potential.5 Curious about the
economic and resource possibilities in the region, in the 1850s the
Province of Canada6 and the British Government each funded their
own exploratory expeditions to determine if the North-West was
suitable for settlement. The two reports produced mixed reviews.
While the British survey was tepid in its assessment of the NorthWest’s potential, the Canadian expedition concluded that the region
held enough economic promise that it was indeed worthy of annexation
and settlement.7 It is likely for this reason that when the Fathers
5  
Capt. William F. Butler, The Great Lone Land: A Narrative of Travel and Adventure
in the North-West of America (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, Low, & Searle, 1873).
6  
Between 1840 and 1867 the Province of Canada included what is now known as the
provinces of Ontario and Quebec.
7  
See Henry Youle Hind, Narrative of the Canadian Red River Exploring Expedition
of 1857 and of the Assiniboine and Saskatchewan Exploring Expedition of 1858
(London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1860).

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol28/iss1/23

4

Grebstad: Outpost
G R E B S TA D

5

of Confederation met at the 1864 Quebec Conference to discuss
possible Confederation, they included in their 72 Resolutions a clause
specifically targeted at keeping the door to annexation of the NorthWest open.8 Additionally, when Confederation was achieved three
years later, section 146 of the British North America Act provided
for the eventual admission of Rupert’s Land into Confederation.9
When it became apparent that it would be in the best interest
of the Honourable Company to relinquish control of Rupert’s Land,
and that Canada was willing to bring the lands into the Dominion,
a transfer to the Crown was eventually arranged for 1 December
1869, with a transfer to the Dominion to occur sometime thereafter.
Importantly, no one bothered to consult with the inhabitants who
understandably took umbrage at being traded off like chattel. When
the Lieutenant-Governor-designate, the Dominion Minister of Public
Works and long-time annexation advocate William McDougall,
arrived at the Hudson’s Bay Post at Pembina near the international
border south of Red River on 30 October 1869, he was met there by
a representative of the Métis National Committee, an organization
formed by Métis in Red River, who bade him not to enter the
territory of the North-West without the committee’s authorization.10
This single act put a stop to the peaceful and orderly transferral of
the region to the Dominion.
Fort Garry and its stores were seized; a pro-Canada counterresistance was organized and failed, its adherents imprisoned;
and eventually the Provisional Government of Assiniboia with
representation from English and French Parishes was assembled with
Louis Riel as its President. Thomas Scott, a bellicose Orangeman
and staunch pro-Canada advocate who had come to the North West
as part of the Dawson Road labour force, was executed by firing
squad at Riel’s order on 4 March 1870. Scott’s execution became
the cassus belli for many Anglophone Protestants in Ontario and
Early Canadiana Online Website, “Resolution 10” Report of Resolutions adopted
at a Conference of Delegates from the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New
Brunswick, and the Colonies of Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, held at the
City of Quebec, October 10, 1864, as the Basis of a proposed confederation of those
Provinces and Colonies, http://eco.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.9_01325/1?r=0&s=1,
(accessed 14 November 2018).
9  
British North America Act, 1867, 30&31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.)
10  
“Letter from William McDougall to The Honourable Secretary of State for
the Provinces” dated 31 October 1869 in Correspondence Relative to the Recent
Disturbances in the Red River Settlement, (London: William Clowes & Sons, 1870), 4.
8  
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amongst the militia volunteers who subsequently deployed to Red
River. The resistance eventually ended when representatives of the
Provisional Government provided their list of rights and demands to
Dominion representatives in Ottawa, resulting in the Manitoba Act,
which created the Province of Manitoba in May of 1870 and which
was later ratified by the Provisional Government at Fort Garry.
Almost from the outset of the resistance, a military response
was contemplated. Indeed, contracts for the construction of the boats
necessary to convey a force though the rivers and lakes between
Thunder Bay and Fort Garry and orders to improve the corduroy
road leading North West of the former were issued as early as
January 1870.11 Although initially cool to the idea of suppressing
the resistance by force, interest amongst the political leadership in
Ottawa in the deployment of a military force increased exponentially
once word of Scott’s execution arrived in Ontario.12 Only five days
after Scott’s execution, on 9 March 1870, the Governor General
informed the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Earl Granville, that
if troops were to be dispatched, they should begin movement in late
April. Later, on 23 March 1870, in an early intimation of the expected
role of the force in Manitoba, the Colonial Office informed the War
Office that the British General Officer Commanding in British North
America, Lieutenant-General James Lindsay, might be required to
despatch to the Red River Territory “a detachment not exceeding
200 infantry and a small force of artillery, in company with a larger
body of Canadians, to maintain order in that settlement during
the process of its annexation to Canada [emphasis added].”13 This
observation, coupled with the fact that the War Office was insistent
that British regular forces would be withdrawn in the fall of 1871,

11  
Simon Dawson, Report of the Red River Expedition of 1870, (Ottawa: Times
Printing and Publishing Co., 1871), 6.
12  
“Copy of a Report of a Committee of the Honorable the Privy Council, dated 16th
December, 1869,” Correspondence and Papers connected with recent occurrences in
the North-West Territories, (Ottawa: I.B. Taylor, 1870), 143.
13  
Early Canadiana Online Website, “Letter from the Colonial Office to the War
Office dated 23 March 1870,” The War Office to Lieutenant-General the Honourable
James Lindsay, http://eco.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.91209/2?r=0&s=1, (accessed
14 November 2018).
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indicates that the use of Canadian Militia as a form of colonial
garrison was contemplated even before the force was assembled.14
In April, rumours about a possible expedition to the North-West
were circulating amongst the ranks of the militia.15 Militia General
Orders of 12 May 1870 listed the officers who had been selected to
proceed to Red River as part of the Red River Expeditionary Force.
This brigade was a combined force composed of a British Regular
Battalion, the 1st Battalion 60th Rifles, supported by a troop of
British artillery and a small force of British engineers. The Canadian
contingent consisted of two ad-hoc battalions of Canadian Militia
volunteers from Active Militia Corps in Ontario and Quebec, styled
the 1st Ontario Rifles and 2nd Quebec Rifles respectively.16 These
two militia battalions became the colonial proto-garrison of the postConfederation North-West.17
A moment should be taken here to investigate the Canadian
militia system from which these two battalions derived. The structure
of this system was articulated in May 1868 in An Act respecting the
Militia and Defence of the Dominion of Canada (hereafter the
Militia Act 1868). The Canadian Militia was organized into two
divisions: the Active and Reserve Militia. The former referred to
volunteers who joined local militia corps and drilled regularly. In
1870, the Active Militia numbered 40,000 men. The Reserve Militia,
conversely, consisted of all the men of the country not exempted
from service due to age, profession or family status, who were not
members of the Active Militia and did not parade or train. They
simply represented the country’s population liable to service in a
levée en masse in the event of emergency, estimated in 1870 to
number 675,000 men.18
The head and Commander-in-Chief of the Canadian Militia was,
and remains to this day, the Governor General while the responsibility
Early Canadiana Online Website, “Letter from the War Office to the
Lieutenant General Lindsay dated 24 March 1870,” The War Office to LieutenantGeneral the Honourable James Lindsay, http://eco.canadiana.ca/view/
oocihm.91209/2?r=0&s=1, (accessed 14 November 2018).
15  
“From Montreal” The Volunteer Review, 4, no. 15, (11 April 1870), 230.
16  
Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Militia General Orders (17) No. 1,
12 May 1870.
17  
It should be noted that this was not the first military force sent to Red River to
conduct colonial garrison duties. See Stanley’s Toil and Trouble for a comprehensive
history of the British garrisons that spent time in Red River.
18  
Ibid., 10-11.
14  
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to administer the militia fell to Minister of Militia and Defence.19 The
Adjutant-General was the senior military officer responsible to the
Minister for the military administration of the Militia.20 In 1874,
the Dominion Government decided to create the position of General
Officer Commanding, and in 1875 Briton Sir Edward Selby Smyth was
named the General Officer Commanding of the Canadian Militia.21
Administratively, the militia was divided into military districts. In
1870, nine military districts were in existence and each commanded
by a Deputy Adjutant-General with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.22
Returning now to the Red River Expeditionary Force, volunteers
were assembled for a term of service of one year. By mid-May the
force mustered at the Crystal Palace in Toronto where they were
drilled, received their uniforms and equipment, and underwent
medical examinations. On 21 May the expedition’s commander,
British Colonel Garnet Wolseley, moved to Collingwood on Georgian
Bay with a vanguard of British regulars and arranged for the force to
be transported by steamship to Thunder Bay. In the weeks following
the force’s arrival in in Thunder Bay, it built a corduroy road from
Thunder Bay to Shebandowan Lake and thereafter it executed a
herculean task by making its way by canoe and portage to Fort
Garry via the Precambrian morass of muskeg, rock, and lakes that is
northwestern Ontario. The lead elements of British regulars arrived
at Fort Garry in a driving rain on the morning of 24 August 1870.
Despite the overtures that the expedition was a “peacekeeping”

Militia Act, 31 Victoria, c. 40 (Canada), s. 1&2 (1868).
“Militia Report 1870” National Defence Directorate of History and Heritage
(DHH), 2019, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/mili-rep/
Militia-Report-1870.pdf, (accessed January 25).
21  
Stephen Harris, Canadian Brass: The Growth of the Canadian Military Profession
1860-1919. (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1980), 47. The position
of General Officer Commanding remained in effect until 1904 when it was replaced
by the new office of Chief of the General Staff.
22  
Militia Act (1868), s. 12. Four in Ontario, three in Quebec, and one each in
New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. If large enough, districts were further sub-divided
into Brigade Divisions, and they into Regimental Divisions which were in turn subdivided into Company Divisions. The purpose of the Brigade/Regimental/Company
divisions was to maintain an up to date nominal roll of the reserve militia in the
district, in order to facilitate the mobilization of the population in the event of an
emergency. To maintain the reserve rolls, Regimental Divisions had appointed to
them one Lieutenant-Colonel and two Majors, all members of the Reserve Militia,
while Company Divisions were appointed a Captain and two sub-officers of the
Reserve Militia.
19  
20  
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force, and the fact that the resistance had all but ended with the
unanimous ratification of the Manitoba Act by the Legislative
Assembly of Assiniboia three months prior, the 60th Rifles deployed
in order of battle. As they advanced on the Fort, they discovered
that Louis Riel and his principal lieutenants had, wisely, fled the
scene. Two days later, the first elements of the Canadian militia
volunteers arrived and settled down to garrison the newest provincial
capital in the Dominion. By 2 September, Colonel Wolseley and the
British Regulars had departed, en route to Ontario and thence home
to the United Kingdom. Command of the Dominion colonial garrison
in the North-West devolved to Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Jarvis,
Commanding Officer of the 1st Ontario Rifles.23

seven years in the north-west
The Canadian garrison in Red River spent the next seven years
representing Dominion authority in the newly acquired territory.
Throughout its tenure, the size and organization of the Dominion
forces in Manitoba waxed and waned, influenced by local security
circumstances and, as ever, federal fiscal realities. After its first year
of garrison duty, the Adjutant-General in Ottawa, British Colonel
Patrick Robertson-Ross, decided to reduce the size of the force in
Manitoba, noting the imminent termination of the volunteers’ terms
of service, and stating in his annual report that “the necessity ...
for maintaining, under arms, so large a force in that Province no
longer exists (the peaceful solution of all difficulties there having [as
expected] been happily realized).”24
Consequently, the garrison was reduced in size from 862 to 89
– four officers and eighty-five men, under the command of Major
Acheson G. Irvine.25 In addition to his decision to reduce the force,
Colonel Robertson-Ross made a number of other recommendations
to the Minister of Militia concerning the defence of Manitoba, the
23  
For a detailed account of the Red River Expedition see G.L. Huyshe, The Red
River Expedition, (London: Macmillan and Co., 1871). Captain Huyshe was a staff
officer to Colonel Garnet Wolseley during the expedition.
24  
“Militia Report, 1870” DND DHH Website, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/
dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/mili-rep/Militia-Report-1870.pdf, 31 (accessed 24 January
2019).
25  
Ibid., 38.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2019

9

Canadian Military History, Vol. 28 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 23
10

Outpost

most important being his suggestion that a new military district,
Number 10, should be created in the Province of Manitoba. His
recommendation was subsequently approved by Order-in-Council on
19 January 1871.26 Despite the early approval of his recommendation,
orders from Militia Headquarters to create Military District No. 10
were not published until October 1871.
The eighty-nine militiamen who remained in the garrison were
volunteers from the original force who agreed to be retained for at
least another six months, with the possibility of extending the terms
for a further six months as determined by the Commanding Officer.
Those of the original expedition desirous of discharge were offered a
grant of land equal to 160 acres in Manitoba, or transportation back
to the military district of their enrolment.27 The discharge began in
earnest in May and culminated in June 1871.28
As the ranks of the militia defenders in Fort Garry thinned,
foreboding martial clouds gathered. In 1871, Ottawa received word
of a possible Fenian incursion into Manitoba and preparations for
the defence of the new province were undertaken. The Order-inCouncil that authorized the creation of Military District No. 10 of
January 1871 was finally enforced in Militia General Orders (23)
of 16 October 1871. In the same order, Lieutenant-Colonel William
Osborne Smith, Deputy Adjutant-General of Military District No.
5 (Montreal, Quebec) was designated the new Deputy AdjutantGeneral of Military District No. 10. Additionally, even though only
four months had passed since the reduction of the force in Manitoba,
Militia General Orders (23) called for volunteers for a second Red
River Expeditionary Force to augment the eighty-nine members
of the garrison in Fort Garry.29 Captain Thomas Scott of Perth,
Ontario was selected to command this expedition which consisted of
275 officers and men, drawn again from Ontario and Quebec Active
Militia corps.30
Ibid., 32.
Manitoba News Letter, “Discharge of Volunteers,” 27 May 1871, 2.
28  
“Militia Report 1871,” National Defence DHH, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.
gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/mili-rep/Militia-Report-1871.pdf
(accessed
25
January 2019).
29  
“Militia General Orders (23) dated 16 October 1871” The Canada Gazette, 5, no.
17, (21 October 1871): 1.
30  
“Militia Report, 1871” DND DHH Website, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/
dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/mili-rep/Militia-Report-1871.pdf,
40 (accessed 25
January 2019).
26  
27  

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol28/iss1/23

10

Grebstad: Outpost
G R E B S TA D

11

The Fenian threat of October 1871 sputtered out quickly when a
U.S. Cavalry force rounded up the invading ‘army’ after it pillaged
the Hudson’s Bay Company Fort at Pembina. The Second Red River
Expedition arrived on 18 November, long after the Fenian threat had
ended.31 Ironically, the whole of the officers of the Second Expedition,
with the exception of one, were veterans of the First Expedition who
had been discharged and sent home not long before.32 The Second
Expedition merged with the remnants of the First and formed what
thereafter was referred to as the Provisional Battalion of Infantry.33
In the spring of 1872, the terms of service for the First Red
River Expedition men who had stayed on in Fort Garry and those
who had come out in the Second Red River Expedition were nearing
an end. Whereas the year previous the Adjutant-General had been
anxious to reduce the size of the garrison in Manitoba, the recent
Fenian unpleasantness convinced Robertson-Ross to authorize
Osborne Smith to discharge the men whose terms of service were
expiring, but only insofar as he could maintain the size of the force
in Manitoba through local recruitment. Osborne Smith was also
informed that, should he be unable to do so, reinforcements from the
eastern provinces may be required.34
There was an insufficient number of local recruits in Manitoba
willing to join the ranks of the volunteers. Consequently, on 6
September 1872, the Adjutant-General once again issued orders to
the military districts to recruit volunteers for service in Manitoba.
Two hundred more volunteers were sought from Active Militia corps

Manitoba Liberal, “Arrival of the Troops” 19 November 1871, 3; Justus Griffin,
From Toronto to Fort Garry. An account of the Second Expedition to Red River.
Diary of a Private Solider, (Hamilton: Evening Times, 1893), 53.
32  
“Militia Report, 1871” DND DHH Website, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/
dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/mili-rep/Militia-Report-1871.pdf, 40 (accessed 25 January
2019).
33  
The original name was the Provisional Battalion of Rifles, but was renamed to the
Provisional Battalion of Infantry.
34  
Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Correspondence of the General Officer
Commanding (GOC) of the Canadian Militia and his predecessor, the Adjutant
General, RG 9, “Correspondence from the Adjutant General of Militia to the Deputy
Adjutant General of Military District No. 10,” 10 March 1872, RG 9, Series II B1,
Volume 518.
31  

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2019

11

Canadian Military History, Vol. 28 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 23
12

Outpost

in Ontario and Quebec.35 Additionally, District 7 (Quebec City) was
tasked to provide one officer, one sergeant and twenty-four Gunners
from B Battery School of Gunnery at the Citadel.36 In the fall of 1872,
this draft of men, the Third Red River Expeditionary Force, was
dispatched to Fort Garry and arrived on 23 October. The Provisional
Battalion of Infantry and the composite Artillery Battery became
known, collectively, as the Dominion Forces on Service in Manitoba. 37
In a departure from previous terms of service, which were usually six
months of enrolment with a liability for a further six months at the
discretion of the Commanding Officer, this iteration of the terms of
service were extended to one year with a liability for a further period
of service not exceeding two years. The elongated terms of service
are indicative of the Dominion Government’s inclination to maintain
a long-term garrison in Fort Garry.38
In May of 1873, mere months after the arrival of the third
expedition, Militia Headquarters in Ottawa advertised for a further
156 volunteers to proceed to Manitoba. The plans for this, the Fourth
Red River Expedition, coming hard on the heels of the arrival of the
Third Red River Expedition was doubtless related to the fear of an
Indigenous uprising that was pervasive in Manitoba in the spring of
1873, and a question to which we will return to later. Whereas previous
volunteers were drawn from Ontario and Quebec Active Militia corps,
this draft of replacements came from the Maritime Provinces – fifty
men each from New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Additionally, fiftysix more gunners split between B Battery and its sister organization,
A Battery School of Gunnery in Kingston, Ontario, were dispatched
LAC, Correspondence of the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Canadian
Militia and his predecessor, the Adjutant General, RG 9, “Correspondence from
Adjutant General of Militia to all Deputy Adjutant Generals” 6 September 1872,
Series II B1, Volume 518. The quotas for the various districts were as follows: District
1 (London) 25; District 2 (Toronto) 35; District 3 (Kingston) 20; District 4 (Ottawa)
20; Districts 5 and 6 (Montreal and St. Jean) 66; and District 7 (Quebec City) 34.
36  
Ibid.
37  
Public Archives Manitoba, Journal of the Provisional Battalion of Rifles at Fort
Garry, 1871 as found in James Taylor Collection, MG6, B5. The journal erroneously
only refers to the 184 volunteers who were destined to join the Provisional Battalion
of Rifles, and leaves out the 24 artillerymen from B Battery who formed the Dominion
Artillery on Service in Manitoba.
38  
LAC, Correspondence of the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Canadian
Militia and his predecessor, the Adjutant General, RG 9, “Correspondence from
Adjutant General of Militia to all Deputy Adjutant Generals” 6 September 1872,
Series II B1, Volume 518.
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to bolster the militia fire power in Winnipeg. The Fourth Expedition
arrived in July 1873.
In 1874 the Active Militia underwent a nation-wide reduction
from 40,000 to 30,000 which had a significant impact on the militia in
Manitoba. In the fall of 1874, Militia Headquarters ordered LieutenantColonel Osborne Smith to reduce the size of the Dominion Forces in
Manitoba. The Militia, having for four years provided deterrence and
enforced law and order in the North-West, were replaced. The NorthWest Mounted Police, which had been created the year previous in
1873, assumed the preponderance of these duties.39
Osborne Smith was authorized to offer discharging soldiers a
gratuity of two months’ pay and a sum of money equivalent to the
cost of transport to the volunteer’s original Military District. This led
to a doubling of the number of men seeking discharge, and Osborne
Smith was compelled to prioritize them based on their length of
service and conduct.40 In his annual reports for the District in 1873
and 1874, Osborne Smith reported that the number of Dominion
Forces under his command was reduced from 344 to 200 personnel.41
While many of the duties of the Militia may have been taken
over by the Mounties, the military force did not disappear overnight.
On the contrary, the size and organization of the militia in Manitoba
remained consistent for the next three years, with only slight
variations in the number of men enrolled until June 1876 when Militia
Headquarters ordered another reduction in size of the Dominion
Forces in Manitoba. Although political leaders had hoped that the
Militia volunteers would settle in Manitoba and thus provide a cohort
of experienced soldiers to be called upon in emergencies, less than ten
percent of the men released in 1876 chose to remain in the area.42 The
majority took their land warrants home with them upon discharge,
hoping to realize a greater profit in southern Ontario, given that

Manitoba Free Press, “Military Here to Be Reduced,” 4 November 1874, 1.
“Militia Report 1874,” DND DHH Website, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/
dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/mili-rep/Militia-Report-1874.pdf, 51 (accessed 25 January
2019).
41  
“Militia Report 1873,” DND DHH Website, , http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/
dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/mili-rep/Militia-Report-1873.pdf, (accessed 25 January
2019) and “Militia Report 1874” DND DHH Website, accessed 25 January 2019,
http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/mili-rep/MilitiaReport-1874.pdf,.
42  
Manitoba Free Press, “Dominion Forces in the North-West,” 20 July 1876, 4.
39  
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speculators in Manitoba were offering much lower prices for the land
warrants.43
The 1876 reductions were the initial death throes of the colonial
garrison in Manitoba. In May of 1877 the editors of the Manitoba
Free Press lamented that “they [are] sorry to learn there is some
foundation for the rumour which prevailed yesterday that the garrison
of Canadian regular militia hitherto maintained here, and which has
been looked upon as one of the institutions of the place, is likely to
be abolished in the course of a few weeks.”44 There was surprisingly
little delay between the official announcement of the disbandment of
the regular garrison in May and the act itself. In August 1877, almost
seven years to the day that the Canadian Militia arrived in Fort
Garry, the Dominion’s colonial garrison in Manitoba was disbanded.

the dominion’s strategic tool in the north-west
What was the impetus for the Dominion Government to keep this
rather robust force on its colonial frontier? The logistical demands
alone were a sufficient argument to dismiss the force at an early date.
The force was isolated on the margins of colonized territory with no
reliable line of communication between the political, popular, and
economic power base of central Canada. As one settler put it, Fort
Garry sat beyond the Ultima Thule of the civilized world.45 What
role did this colonial outpost play?
A necessary precondition to answer that question is to understand
the Dominion of Canada’s strategic intent in the North-West. In very
simple terms, this intent was articulated in the joint address of 17
December 1867 by the Canadian House of Commons and Senate sent
to Queen Victoria. In it, the Canadian political leaders expressed their
arguments for the joining of the Dominion with Rupert’s Land. The
proffered list of benefits to be derived from such a transfer is lengthy,
but throughout there is a common theme of pan-Imperial benefit.
For example, the Canadian government suggested that annexation
would “promote the prosperity of the Canadian people, and conduce
to the advantage of the whole Empire … if [Canada’s authority] were
Manitoba Free Press, ‘Local and Provincial’, 4 August 1877, 4.
Manitoba Free Press, “Expected Abolition of the Garrison,” 26 May 1877, 4.
45  
Manitoba Free Press, “Music Hath Charms” 19 August 1876, 5.
43  
44  
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extended westward to the Pacific Ocean.” Additionally, they argued
that the life of the British subjects living therein would be “materially
enhanced by the formation therein of political institutions bearing
analogy, as far as circumstances will admit, to those which exist in
the several Provinces of this Dominion.”46 This last observation seems
a thinly veiled reference to the threat of American republicanism and
the inherent benefits of British constitutional monarchy. In short,
the strategic intent of the Dominion of Canada was to annex to
the North-West for its exploitation, and to preserve and enhance
the British Empire with a trans-continental Dominion of Canada
as a constituent element thereof. With these strategic goals as a
foundation, this article now turns to the question of how the Dominion
Government used this military force to achieve the three military
objectives of colonial garrisons articulated by Peter Burroughs: preempting foreign aggression, stabilizing the frontier, and providing law
and order.

pre-empting foreign aggression
A threat to the Canadian annexation of the North-West, at least
as many contemporary Canadians saw it, was the ever-expanding
United States, although in the end this threat was more bark than
bite. American interest in annexing British North America was a
constant theme from the end of the Revolutionary War.47 By the
mid-nineteenth century, American and British/Canadian westward
expansion resulted in their interests colliding to the west of the
Great Lakes.
American influence grew in the latter half of the nineteenth
century as settlement of the American West increased. For example,
in 1849 the territory of Minnesota was home to only 5,000 people. By

“Joint Address to Her Majesty the Queen from the Senate and House of Commons
of Canada,” Copy and Extracts of Correspondence between the Colonial Office, the
Government of the Canadian Dominion, and the Hudson’s Bay Company, relating
to the Surrender of Rupert’s Land by the Hudson’s Bay Company, and for the
Admission Thereof into the Dominion of Canada, (London: HM Stationary Office,
1869), 1-2.
47  
Russell W. Fridley, “When Minnesota Coveted Canada” in Minnesota History,
41 (2), 76-79.
46  
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1860 that number had grown to 172,000.48 Additionally, immigration
from the western regions of the United States into the North-West
increased substantially and many American settlers openly agitated
for annexation by the United States.49 These influential changes in
both the economic and demographic make-up of the North-West and
the subsequent burgeoning influence of Minnesota and the American
West threatened to pull the North-West into the American Republic.
Fortunately for Canada, the Civil War distracted American
interest in the North-West, if only for a few years. When the war
ended, tepid American interest in annexation resumed, emanating
primarily from Minnesota. One of the most outspoken post-Civil
War proponents of American expansion was Minnesota Senator
Alexander Ramsey. To Senator Ramsey, the Red River Settlement
was a spring-board to the North-West, the resources of which he
envisioned providing a massive economic boon to his state.50 Senator
Ramsey was not alone in his covetous thinking. While Ramsey was
the dominant expansionist force in Minnesota, Charles Sumner, the
chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was his equal in
Washington. Sumner was extremely vocal in his support of the removal
of British authority from North America.51 To illustrate, when the
United States purchased Alaska in 1867, Sumner urged ratification of
the purchase as he felt it was a crucial step to occupation of the whole
of the North American continent.52
While a small group of American policy makers were supportive
of annexation, the movement lacked broad political support. With
the exception of peak periods of animosity, such as the War of 1812,
Canada never figured prominently in the minds of the majority of
American political leaders. When it did, the consensus was that
time and inertia would inevitably draw Canada into the Republic.53
However, if interest in American expansion into British North
George F.G. Stanley, The Birth of Western Canada, A History of the Riel
Rebellions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), 24.
49  
Arthur S. Morton, A History of the Canadian West to 1870-71: Being a History
of Rupert’s Land (the Hudson’s Bay Company’s Territory) and of the North-West
Territory (including the Pacific Slope), (London: T. Nelson & Sons, 1939), 854.
50  
Ibid., 696.
51  
Charles P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: a History of Canadian External
Policies, vol. 1, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 29.
52  
David Orchard, The Fight for Canada: Four Centuries of Resistance to American
Expansionism (Westmount: Robert Davies Multimedia Pub., 1999), 49.
53  
Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 29
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America was lukewarm in the United States, the same could not be
said of the angst amongst Canadian political leaders, whose fear of
the Yankee Bogeyman was a persistent theme. Indeed, it seems there
was more fear of American expansion in Canada than there was
appetite for annexation in America.
That said, Canada’s fears were not wholly without merit. American
land purchases, annexations, and outright conquests in Texas,
Mexico, and Alaska demonstrated the voracious appetite of American
expansionism. Likewise, a series of Anglo-American treaties, such as
the 1842 Weber-Ashburton Treaty and later the 1848 Oregon Treaty,
revealed Great Britain’s willingness to appease American interests by
ceding future Canadian territory in order to avoid potential conflict.54
Additionally, the history of American incursions into Canada officially
or by non-state actors in the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812,
and during the Fenian invasions all contributed to a general sense
of unease amongst Canadians about American intentions in British
North America.
This mindset explains why the Red River Resistance of 18691870 caused fits of concern amongst Canadian political leaders who
worried the United States could exploit the situation to their benefit.
Reports from Fort Garry that the resistance was taking a proAmerican bias increased the government’s appetite for dispatching
an expeditionary force. Considering that Canada’s military power
was less than impressive, and that the United States military,
although demobilized after the Civil War, was large, well-armed, and
battle-hardened, British involvement was considered a necessity for
any sort of legitimate dissuasive effect to be realized.55 Sir John A.
Macdonald stated this outright in a letter to the Governor General
on 26 January 1870, writing that “it is of great importance that some
of the force should be Regular Troops as it will convince the United
States Government and people that Her Majesty’s Government has
no intention of abandoning this continent.”56 Thus, from a military
perspective, a joint Anglo-Canadian expedition was necessary for
the realization of Canadian strategic goals, not only to potentially
subdue the insurgents, but also to pre-empt the danger of American

Ibid., 5.
Stanley, Toil and Trouble, 74.
56  
Extract from a letter of Sir John A. Macdonald, 26 January 1870, as quoted in
Stanley, The Birth of Western Canada, 129.
54  
55  
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interference.57 Fruitless efforts from the Dominion Government to
convince the British to keep a regular garrison in Fort Garry meant
that the only military deterrent available was a Canadian militia
force.
While the strength and quality of the garrison in Fort Garry was
insufficient to defeat any concerted American invasion, it nonetheless
existed as an overt symbol of Dominion authority. Moreover, the
maintenance of a Dominion garrison in Fort Garry continued the
British practice of deploying forces to the region to deter American
expansion. In 1846, in the face of increasing American expansionism
in the west, the Imperial Government in London had deployed a force
of 347 soldiers of the 6th Regiment of Foot, the Royal Warwickshires,
to garrison the Lower Fort, near present day Selkirk, Manitoba.58
Again in 1856, in response to the arrival of US Cavalry near Pembina,
the Imperial Government dispatched 120 soldiers from the Royal
Canadian Rifles in St. John’s to Fort Garry via Hudson’s Bay. The
Rifles remained until 1861.59
Official American expansionism was not the only threat causing
consternation amongst the Canadian political leadership. Throughout
the 1870s and 80s there remained a pervasive fear of military incursions
by Fenians in both Manitoba and in Ottawa. Rumours of Fenian
hordes were rife enough in January 1872 that, mere months after the
initial abortive invasion of Manitoba, several letters to the editor of
the Manitoba Liberal were penned to express concern. One writer,
going by the pseudonym “Correspondent” asked “how long may we
command the services of the brave Volunteers who now protect us?”
“In a short time their term of service will expire,” he continued,
“and we will be in as piteous a condition as ever, looking to another
[US Cavalry officer] Colonel Wheaton for protection – hoping and
trembling.”60 “Correspondent” went on to suggest the appropriate
size and constitution of a volunteer militia for the province, with a
Charles P. Stacey, “The Military Aspect of Canada’s Winning of the West, 18701885,” The Canadian Historical Review 21, 1 (1940), 6-7.
58  
Frits Pannekoek A Snug Little Flock: The Social Origins of the Riel Resistance of
1869-70, (Winnipeg: Watson and Dwyer, 1991), 27.
59  
“The Royal Canadian Rifles at Fort Garry 1857-1861” in History of the Royal
Canadian Rifle Regiment, Department of National Defence Directorate of History
and Heritage Archives, 504.013 (D2), Ottawa, Ontario; George F. G. Stanley, Toil
and Trouble. Military Expeditions to Red River, (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1989),
19-52.
60  
Manitoba Liberal, “Correspondence” 13 January 1872, 1.
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focus on a cavalry force composed of “sixty or seventy dashing young
fellows” capable of rapidly deploying to meet interlopers from the
south and thus “save our families from destruction by ragamuffin
bands, or, what would still be more terrible, the desecrating hand of
the religious fanatic.”61 Like their imperial predecessors, the Canadian
militia volunteers served as a physical manifestation of authority in
colonial territory, even if a predominantly symbolic one, to both state
and non-state external aggressors.

stabilizing frontiers
In 1872 Robertson-Ross undertook a tour and inspection of the NorthWest of the country at a time when the Dominion Government was
considering the practicality of maintaining the Provisional Battalion
in Fort Garry. In his report to the Minister of Militia he pointedly
observed that,
No doubt whatever exists in my mind as to the propriety of [maintaining
a force in Manitoba], in view of the presence of many bands of Indians,
considering the primitive state of the Province, the strong political party
feeling which exists, and the fact that on both sides of the International
Boundary Line restless and reckless characters among both white men
and Indians abound.62

Ross’ observations epitomize the security concerns amongst the
local and federal political leadership and newly-settled citizenry of
Manitoba from internal political strife, criminals and ne’er-do-wells
traversing the plains, and the perceived threat of Indigenous bands.
Security was thus a principal concern for those who were in the
process of installing a colonial footprint in the North-West.
Unfortunately, the very presence of Indigenous bands caused
disquiet amongst settlers and could dissuade immigrants, anathema
to the strategic goals of the Dominion in the North-West. Take, for
example, the concern that was raised in the winter and spring of 1873
in the western reaches of the province. Intelligence was received, and
Ibid.
Colonel Robertson-Ross, Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Militia
Report 1872, (Ottawa: LB Taylor, 1873), cxi.
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confirmed by an emissary from the Indian Department, that a band
of Sioux on the Little Missouri River led by a man named Little
Knife intended to raid some part of the province in the spring. The
concern was most acute in what is now western Manitoba. Archibald
Macdonald, the chief trader at the Hudson’s Bay Post in Fort Ellice,
wrote to Donald A. Smith, Member of Parliament and Governor of
the Hudson’s Bay Company, in January 1873 suggesting that “it will
be for the benefit of both the Company and the Government that
troops be sent up here before the end of March.”63 Additionally, in
March of 1873, the people of Palestine, now known as Gladstone, sent
a petition to Lieutenant Governor Morris in which they expressed
concern at the aforementioned intelligence and pleaded with Morris
to furnish protection, in the form of a hundred soldiers, in order to
“protect our settlement from being ravaged.” The anonymous author
went on to lament “I do not understand the policy of the present
Dominion Government in regard to immigration, but I do not think
many immigrants will be induced to go farther west unless they
can see some chance of their lives and property being protected
[emphasis added].”64
Some contemporaries suggested that the rumours of Indigenous
bands being on the war path were created by the Hudson’s Bay
Company to prompt the Dominion Government to deploy soldiers
to reassure the settlers – soldiers who would require sustainment
from the only source of provisions in the region, the Hudson’s Bay
Company. The Free Press, for example, considered the threat of an
Indigenous uprising overblown, even referring to the situation in print
as the “Indian Humbug.” The editors reported that “the alarm at
Ottawa is something most remarkable. Our telegraphic dispatches
indicate that the Lieut. Governor has started on his return to this
country, in anticipation of Indian troubles; and, besides, that the
military force in this country is to be reinforced.”65 (Referring to the
fourth Red River Expedition that was in the process of organizing.)
While the editors at the Free Press may have dismissed the
fears of Indigenous violence as a contrivance, their colleagues at the
“Extract of a letter from Archibald McDonald, Esq., Chief Trader, addressed to
D.A. Smith, dated 11 February 1873, from Fort Ellice” in Annual Report on Indian
Affairs for the year ending June 20 1872, Canada Sessional Papers, Volume 5, 1st
Session, 17.
64  
Manitoba Free Press, “Sioux Indians,” 15 March 1873, 5.
65  
Manitoba Free Press, “The Indian Humbug” 3 May 1873, 5.
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Manitoban and North-West Herald were more than happy to stoke
the fires. Two weeks after the Free Press printed their column on the
“Indian Humbug,” the Herald published an editorial that listed the
size of U.S. forces garrisoning the west and asked,
who will say that this array and distribution of force is unnecessary
in the presence of 60,000 Indians who are impressed with the belief
that the advancing settlements of whites will disperse the herds of
buffalo and antelope and appropriate their hunting grounds? With such
a prospect it is folly not to expect that collisions will not occur, and
without great prudence and precaution, the inevitable antagonism may
lead to indescribable horrors of Indian massacre.66

The threat of Indigenous violence—real or perceived—was sufficient
to justify the dispatch of fifty militiamen to Fort Ellice to reassure
the local population.67 On 30 April 1873, Robertson-Ross informed
Donald A. Smith that he had been instructed by the government to
dispatch a military force to Fort Ellice with as little delay as possible,
and that he was authorized to communicate with the Company to
expedite matters.68 The call for volunteers for a Fourth Red River
Expedition was made the very next month in May 1873, and the
expedition arrived in July of that year.
Clashes with Indigenous peoples on both sides of the border
exacerbated the concerns of the settlers in Manitoba. Word of the
defeat of General Terry’s United States Army column during the
Great Sioux War of 1876, which included the 7th Cavalry under
Colonel George Custer immortalized by their defeat at Little Big
Horn, reached Winnipeg at approximately the same time as news
of the reduction of the Dominion Forces in Winnipeg became public
knowledge.69 Such an unhappy confluence of events led the editors of
the Free Press to observe that

Manitoba and Northwest Herald, “Indian Hostilities,” 17 May 1873, 2.
Manitoba Free Press, “The Indian Humbug” 3 May 1873, 5.
68  
LAC, Correspondence of the General Officer Commanding of the Canadian
Militia and His Predecessor the Adjutant General, RG 9, Correspondence from the
Adjutant General of Militia to Donald A. Smith, MP, 30 April 1873, Series II B 1,
Vol. 543.
69  
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the disaster which has befallen Gen. Terry’s expedition against the
rebellious Sioux has engendered a doubt as to the possibility of the U.S.
Government now accomplishing their subjugation during the present
season, and caused a feeling of some anxiety to be exhibited in Canada
as to the degree in which the North-West Territories may be affected by
the course of future events. … To deal with these armed savages, or to be
prepared to deal with them, it is absolutely necessary that the strength
of the Dominion forces in the North-West should be augmented.70

Consternations amongst the local population and settlers about
Indigenous violence, largely overblown and based in racist stereotypes,
nonetheless demanded the presence of a military garrison to provide
security in the frontier region. The Canadian militia volunteers
provided a sense of security and helped to set the conditions for
European settlement in the region. As the area stabilized, at least
from the perspective of the European colonizers, the security role
was taken up by the North-West Mounted Police in 1873, with local
Active Militia Corps being kept on hand for emergencies. Prior to the
arrival of the Mounted Police, however, it was the militia garrison
that ensured law and order in an unruly frontier region.

law and order
While the militia stood as a military deterrent to foreign interlopers
and a reassuring agent to settlers, they were far more active as an
agent in aid of the civil power. Aid to Civil Power is a specific type of
mission performed by military forces in support of local authorities
for the maintenance of peace, order, and good government. It is an
enduring element of the Canadian national mythos that the Canadian
North-West was settled in an orderly and peaceful manner, a view
deliberately at odds with the more violent experience in the United
States. To an extent this is true, although lamentably the credit
for the orderly settlement of the Canadian North-West is too often
attributed solely to the North-West Mounted Police. Notwithstanding
the very important role the Mounties played in the maintenance of
law and order, the role played by the Dominion Forces on Service
in Manitoba in establishing a lawful, orderly, and settler-friendly
Winnipeg Free Press, “Dominion Forces in the North-West,” 17 July 1876, 2.
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society is little known. Like other regions of Canada, the militia was
an embryonic police and civil defence force in the North-West that
set the conditions for British settlement and growth.
The authority for local militia forces to act in such measure was
articulated in the Militia Act 1868 thusly:
The Active Militia shall be liable to be called out with their arms and
ammunition in aid of the Civil Power in case of riot or other emergency
requiring such services. ... The Officers and men, when so called out,
shall ... be special constables, and shall be considered to act as such so
long as they remain so called out.71

Using militiamen to maintain law and order was commonplace in
the latter half of the nineteenth century. Militia corps were, in many
corners of the Dominion, the only public security force available to
civic leadership. Military historian Desmond Morton has chronicled
the use of the militia in aid to the civil power. Reflecting on the
diverse number of threats to public order, Morton observed that
“in the absence of effective local or provincial police forces, the
militia were frequently the only available support for magistrates
confronted by rioting Orangemen or defiant strikers.”72 Today, the
use of the Canadian military in a law enforcement role is a rarity, but
it was considered a routine task for the militiamen of the nineteenth
century. Throughout Canada, both pre- and post-Confederation, the
military, in the form of British regulars or, later, Canadian militia,
was used to assist in maintaining social order. Post-Confederation
Manitoba was no exception.
The question of maintaining law and order in the region was given
serious thought prior to the departure of the expedition. In a letter
to the Deputy Minister of Militia dated 19 April 1870, LieutenantGeneral Lindsay mentioned that fifty men from Eastern Canada were
to be enrolled for a new mounted police force in Manitoba, with
a goal of recruiting an additional 150 men in Manitoba once the

An Act respecting the Militia and Defence of the Dominion of Canada. 1868, 31
Victoria, c. 40.
72  
Desmond Morton, “Aid to the Civil Power: The Canadian Militia in Support of
Social Order, 1867-1914,” The Canadian Historical Review 51 4 (December 1970),
407.
71  

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2019

23

Canadian Military History, Vol. 28 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 23
24

Outpost

transfer to Canadian authority was complete.73 This police force,
however, was to be completely separate from the military expedition,
and under the command of a Captain Cameron, late of the Royal
Artillery, who accompanied the Lieutenant Governor-designate,
William McDougall, to the North-West.74 The planned police force
never materialized and necessitated the use of the militia to fill the
void.
The use of the militia as a tool to ensure peace, order, and
good government began early in the history of Manitoba. The new
province was a rough country exacerbated by ubiquitous ethnoracial tensions. British Army officer Captain George L. Huyshe, who
chronicled his participation in the Wolseley Expedition in his book,
The Red River Expedition, recorded that during the short time that
the British regulars were in Fort Garry, “the place seemed turned
into a very Pandemonium – Indians, half-breeds, and whites, in all
stages of intoxication, fighting and quarreling in the streets with
drawn knives”75 A productive society could not be built on so shaky
a foundation.
This state of affairs is unsurprising when one considers that when
the Wolseley Expedition arrived in Fort Garry, it happened upon a
society in which law enforcement was almost non-existent. Indeed,
Alexander Begg and Walter Nursey recount in their history Ten
Years in Winnipeg that upon the arrival of the Wolseley Expedition,
Winnipeg had only a single police officer.76 Consequently, the militia
became agents of social order far more than bulwarks of national
defence.77
Politically-inspired violence often led to the employment of the
militia in aid of the civil power. One of the first instances of the use of
the Militia in such a manner came during the provincial elections of

James Lindsay, “Letter from Lieutenant-General James Lindsay to the Deputy
Minister of Militia” dated 19 April 1870, Canadiana Online, http://online.
canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.91209/2?r=0&s=1, 12 (accessed 29 January 2019).
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19 September 1872 when a mob assembled in Winnipeg, worked into
fervour by inflammatory rhetoric from the hustings. A requisition
signed by three magistrates for a force of seventy-five soldiers was
immediately filled by the Acting Deputy Adjutant-General Major
Irvine, Osborne Smith being absent on leave in Eastern Canada. The
mob grew violent and was intent on burning the Dominion Savings
Bank to the ground, and while they were able to smash a few windows,
the militia guard arrived in time to prevent the mob from setting the
bank alight. Unfortunately, local printing shops, particularly those
supportive of the Provisional Government of Louis Riel, did not fare
so well and many were severely damaged, their printers smashed. As
the mob became emboldened by drink, another attempt was made
to assault the Dominion Savings Bank where a small guard was
maintained by the militia after the initial confrontation earlier in
the day. Happily, the battalion diarist recorded, in response to the
advancing mob the orders “Guard turn out and fix bayonets proved
too great a barrier [emphasis added].”78 The mob retreated.
In 1873 the provincial legislature was prorogued in disarray after
an attempt to incorporate the City of Winnipeg was stymied by what
some considered the interference of the Hudson’s Bay Company. It
was presumed amongst the aggrieved that the Company feared the
impact of municipal taxes that would accompany incorporation. The
ill-will was substantial enough that the Speaker of the Legislature,
Dr. Bird, was “decoyed from his residence on the pretence of being
called to see a patient, and when near Point Douglas he was taken
forcibly from his cutter, and a pail of hot tar thrown over his face,
head and shoulders.”79 In response to this and in order to “frustrate
the carrying into execution threats freely circulated by citizens to
set fire to the buildings” the Provisional Battalion was requested to
post a guard of fourteen soldiers on the Parliament Buildings, while
another force of soldiers was maintained at the ready in Fort Garry,
should they be required at short notice.80
Later in 1873, the militia was requested to send a detachment
of soldiers to White Horse Plains, which lays thirty kilometers west
of Winnipeg, where a quizzical confrontation between Mennonites,

Journal of the Provisional Battalion of Rifles at Fort Garry, 1871.
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80  
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teamsters, and Métis had turned violent. As the story is related in
the Free Press, a group of Mennonites were traveling in carts across
the prairie when a Métis horseman passed nearby and struck one of
the horses. In retaliation, one of the teamsters driving the cart struck
the Métis with his whip. Tempers flared, and the Métis returned with
a pistol but was fortunately pre-empted from violence by some of his
colleagues. Nonetheless, the Mennonites and their teamsters stopped
in at a local hotel for respite. Shortly thereafter the same Métis
gentleman arrived, and the argument began anew, after which the
same teamster roughed up the Métis. This did not aid in calming the
situation, and soon a large group of the Métis gentleman’s colleagues
arrived at the hotel, armed and in a foul mood. Tempers flared to
the point that the pacifistic Mennonites holed themselves up on the
second floor of the hotel, and a request was expedited to Fort Garry
for assistance. A detachment of fifty soldiers was dispatched from
Fort Garry, accompanied by the Judge of the Queen’s Bench and the
Attorney General of the Province, to arrest the Métis.81 The soldiers
arrested a party of five Métis and marched them back to prison while
escorting the Mennonites into Winnipeg.
Protecting the local prison became a routine task for the militia on
station in Winnipeg. In July of 1873, Osborne Smith furnished another
force of men to retain two Americans, Messrs. Hoy and Keegan, who
had been incarcerated and were awaiting trial on serious criminal
charges, namely the kidnapping of a notorious character named
“Gordon.” There was some concern about flight of the accused, or
rescue by their confederates, necessitating the militia guard.82 Later,
Ambrose Lepine, alleged murderer of Thomas Scott during the era of
the Provisional Government of Assiniboia under Louis Riel, was also
incarcerated in Fort Garry and the militia were asked to provide a
force to both retain him in custody and prevent locals from taking the
law into their own hands. The incident is recorded in the Battalion’s
Journal thusly: “On one or two occasions threats were made in the
presence of the guard to lynch the prisoner, the mob displaying ropes,
but cold steel had a wonderful effect in dispersing the crowd, as the
guard merely fixed swords and remained steady.”83
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While the Militia provided a formed body of troops to conduct
policing duties, one must not overlook the first police force in Winnipeg
was drawn exclusively from the ranks of the Militia garrison. Captain
Villiers of the Quebec Rifles organized the first police force that
consisted of nineteen soldiers of the Militia. Begg and Nursey
recorded that “almost every day [Villiers] could be seen drilling his
recruits in front of the Davis House.”84 Villiers was succeeded by
another volunteer from the Militia, Louis Fasse de Plainval who
even went to the lengths of travelling to Montreal to interview Police
Force authorities there and learn practices that might work well in
Winnipeg.85 Additionally, Captain Edward Armstrong, who came to
Fort Garry as the Quarter Master of the 1st Ontario Rifles and
later served as the Quarter Master of the Provisional Battalion, was
appointed as Sherriff of the Province of Manitoba in 1872, a post he
held until 1876.86
When the North-West Mounted Police was formed in 1873,
unsurprisingly former Militia garrison men such as Major A.G. Irvine
and Captain Herchmer were to be found in its ranks.87 Moreover,
Osborne Smith was named the first, albeit temporary, Commandant
of the force and did much of the early planning and organization to
ensure the later success of the Mounties.88

men behaving badly
Inasmuch as the Militia garrison provided a force for the establishment
of law and order, in many ways it was also, ironically, a key source
of the violence and crime that pervaded early Winnipeg. Despite
what, on the surface, may have been valorous and dutiful service to
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the country, in many cases the conduct of the Militia volunteers was
abysmal. The force encountered the usual variations from good order
and discipline that are common amongst any large military body,
but unfortunately its ranks were also home to those who would
employ violence and intimidation to achieve their goal of an Angloprotestant society in the North-West at the expense of the Métis.

conduct unbecoming
The general crime and misdemeanours of the militia was varied and
common to military forces, particularly those deployed in remote
areas with little in the way of entertainment to keep young hands
and minds occupied. Life as a solider garrisoning a town on the edge
of what was considered by contemporaries to be “civilized” terrain
was rote and boring. Justus Griffin, who deployed to Fort Garry
with the Second Red Expedition, recalled that once he arrived in
Manitoba his life became “the same dreary round of duties and few
changes of scenery and few incidents to interest and occupy the
mind, the arrival of mails from home being the only interesting event
perhaps for weeks.”89 The readily available supply of intoxicants did
not help. Charges against soldiers for drunkenness increased from
56 in 1870 to 470 in 1873, absence without leave increased five-fold
from 99 to 500 in the same time period, and the number of instances
of involvement of Police or Civilians in occasions of military crime
likewise increased from 29 to 112.90
General assault seemed also to be a favourite pass time. For
example, on Christmas Eve, 1873, Mr. J.J. Johnston was driving his
cutter through the city when he was stopped by two soldiers, one
of whom took hold of the horse while the other made to strike Mr.
Johnston, presumably to steal the sleigh. Fortunately, a witness in a
local saloon came to the man’s rescue brandishing a unique type of
sabre, a pool cue, and chased the volunteers off.91 While Mr. Johnston
escaped with his life, James A. Brown was not so lucky. In June of
1874, Gunner Michaud and Corporal Baker got into an argument
after a night of alcoholic excess in the taverns of Winnipeg and Mr.
Griffin, From Toronto to Fort Garry, 53, 56-60.
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91  
Manitoba Free Press, 27 December 1873, 5.
89  
90  

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol28/iss1/23

28

Grebstad: Outpost
G R E B S TA D

29

Brown had innocently stumbled upon them during their fisticuffs and
attempted to break up the fight. Michaud turned on the unfortunate
Good Samaritan and horribly assaulted him with a knife, leaving
him to die in the street. The post-mortem was conducted by Dr.
Turvers during which the body was found to have a great number
of wounds, no less than 33. These included three cuts to the throat,
eight skull fractures, two knife wounds into the skull that penetrated
into the brain, and at least one knife wound that penetrated deep into
the right lung.92 When Gunner Michaud sobered up, he confessed to
the murder saying “[Je suis] coupable dans mon cœur et je mérite le
mort.”93 In a legacy that the Militia authorities probably did not want
to leave, in August 1874 Gunner Michaud was hanged in the yard of
the city court house and thus became the first person to be executed
by the state in Winnipeg.94

the process of intimidation
More pernicious than these admittedly disturbing crimes was the
racially-based violence designed to intimidate local Métis. Frederick
Shore posits in his doctoral thesis for the University of Manitoba, The
Canadians and the Metis: The Re-Creation of Manitoba 1858-1872
that while some of the volunteers’ misbehaviour was simply the result
of poor discipline, much of it was calculated with unsavoury intent.
From an official perspective, the Wolseley Expedition was intended
to be a peacekeeping force. Contrarily, Shore concludes that amongst
the militia volunteers who filled the ranks of the Ontario and Quebec
Battalions – particularly although not exclusively the former – there
was an unofficial mission within the Red River Expeditionary Force
to employ a “Kansas-style influx of armed settlers whose purpose
was to guarantee that the new Province of Manitoba assumed an
Ontario image without the interference of the Métis.”95 Shore refers
to this as the process of intimidation.96
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The list of transgressions perpetrated by militia volunteers
against Métis are too partisan in nature to casually dismiss as
routine soldierly steam-venting. In a paper prepared for the Louis
Riel Institute entitled “The Reign of Terror against the Métis of
Red River,” Lawrence Barkwell, the Coordinator of Métis History
and Heritage Research, articulated a profoundly upsetting list of
volunteer violence that clearly illustrates a partisan bias and targeting
of Métis and their sympathisers.97 Moreover, Métis were not alone in
suffering the intimidation of the volunteers – French Catholics were
also considered legitimate targets of the soldiers who aimed to impose
an Anglophone protestant cultural hegemony on the new province.
The list is too extensive to share in full here, but a sampling of
the events will demonstrate the extent of volunteer intimidation.
Unfortunately, in many instances, whether for a lack of vigour in the
investigation, or perhaps a legitimate lack of evidence, many of the
alleged perpetrators were never brought to justice.
The litany of sins is long: In September of 1870, John Shultz,
leader of the pro-Canada party during the Resistance, broke into the
home of Thomas Spence, the editor of the New Nation, a newspaper
created by Louis Riel after he amalgamated the Nor’ Wester and he
Red River Pioneer, horsewhipped him, and then broke into his office,
scattered his staff and destroyed the printing press.98 In September
of 1870, James Ross, who was representative of the English Métis
and was also a member of the Provisional Government under Riel,
had his home burnt to the ground in an act of arson. In November
of 1870, a man named Landry was set upon by 12-15 soldiers, had a
rope tied around his neck and was dragged for about a hundred feet
before the police were brought to the scene – the soldiers claiming
they wanted revenge for the death of Thomas Scott.
Louis Riel and his family were specific targets of the volunteer
intimidation. In December of 1871, a group of discharged Expeditionary
Force men burst into Riel’s home claiming to have a warrant for his
arrest. He was not home at the time, and the brigands resorted to
Lawrence Barkwell, “The Reign of Terror Against the Metis of Red River.” Virtual
Museum of Metis History and Culture accessed 25 January 2019, http://www.
metismuseum.ca/resource.php/149078..
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threatening the women by holding guns to their heads and demanding
to know Riel’s whereabouts. One member vowed that Riel would be
dead by the end of the evening. This act was disagreeable enough to
motivate several citizens to write a petition to the Lieutenant-Governor
asking him to take steps to ensure such atrocities did not repeat.
Perhaps most grievous was the assault and subsequent murder
of Elzear Goulet, a Métis who was involved in the execution of
Thomas Scott. Goulet had been one of the staunchest supporters
of Riel during the resistance which consequently made him one of
the most despised inhabitants of Red River amongst the virulently
pro-Canada partisans. He remained in Fort Garry after the arrival
of the Wolseley Expedition, while many of his colleagues fled. Joseph
Alfred Mousseau remarked in an October 1870 edition of l’Opinion
Publique, that “depuis l’arrivée des troupes, il était reste au milieu
des métis français, se gardant bien de s’aventurer sur le territoire
ennemi.”99 In September of 1870, Goulet reportedly accepted a job
as a guide for a Mr. Cunningham from Toronto. Goulet crossed from
St. Boniface and was recognized by what Mousseau referred to as
“un parent de l’un des prisonniers de Riel au Fort Garry.”100 He was
then set upon by some volunteers – originating from la vertueuse
Province sœur, as Mousseau sarcastically referred to Ontario, and
fled his assaulters by bolting for St. Boniface.101 He attempted to
swim the Red River to evade his pursuers, but they pelted him
with rocks as he swam, one rock striking him on the head, and he
eventually drowned. No punishment was ever meted out to any of
those involved.102 Compounding the tragedy, his daughter, Laurette
was allegedly raped by members of the Red River Expeditionary
Force and died of her injuries.103

conclusion
As odd as it may feel to consider Canada an imperial power that
colonized the North-West in the latter half of the nineteenth century,
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the parallels between the actions of the Dominion in Rupert’s Land
and Great Britain globally are undeniable. This is particularly true
when considering the role played by the Canadian militia garrison
maintained in Manitoba from 1870 to 1877, an interesting and
enlightening chapter of Canadian military history that is lamentably
unexplored.
Born of the Red River Expeditionary Force sent, ostensibly,
as a peacekeeping force in reaction to the Red River Resistance of
1869-70, the Dominion Forces on Service in Manitoba garrisoned the
newly acquired peripheral colony in order to set the conditions for
the successful settlement and exploitation of the region by the central
Canadian metropole. The garrison, whose numbers waxed and waned
over the years in response to both real and perceived security threats,
fulfilled the three critical military objectives of a colonial garrison.
It provided a military deterrent, albeit predominantly symbolic in
nature, to state and non-state external aggression from the American
Republic to the south. It provided a military reserve for use in
stabilizing the frontier for settlement when European and Canadian
settlers felt trepidations, largely based on racist stereotypes, about
local Indigenous bands. Finally, in the rough and tumble frontier
region where no law enforcement agency existed to maintain peace,
order and good government, at least until the creation of the NorthWest Mounted Police, the militia garrison provided aid to the civil
power to ensure law and order in the region.
Despite these seemingly beneficial acts, one must not fall into the
trap of blind lionization of the militia volunteers. Many came west
with a racial and cultural agenda, to ensure Anglo-protestant cultural
supremacy in the new colony at the expense of its inhabitants. The
soldiers often resorted to off-duty violence in a process of intimidation
against the Métis of the region which contributed mightily to the
latter’s displacement westward and the regrettable abandonment of
their traditional homeland.
The story of the Canadian garrison in Manitoba is deserving of
further investigation. It may lack the excitement of battle narrative,
it occurred in an isolated post far from the economic and political
focus of the country, and its timeline is relatively short. Nonetheless,
the militia volunteers in Manitoba made a distinct impact, for good
or ill, on the evolution of Canadian society and the growth of the
Canadian nation.
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